Naturalistic, normative, and ethnographic approaches to ethical life seem to describe very different worlds. Focusing on ordinary social interactions and ideologies surrounding them, this article argues the ethnographic stance allows us to look in two directions, where we can see some points of articulation among these worlds. In one, the domain of naturalistic explanations, ethical life draws on affordances offered by psychological, linguistic, and other processes usually described as operating beneath the level of people's awareness. In the other, the normative domain of reasons, principles, and arguments about them, it is the demands of ordinary social interaction that form some of the most ubiquitous inducements for people to account for themselves in ways that can become conscious, reflexive, and purposeful. When explicit reasons and justifications result they may give rise to historical objects like moral codes and ethical precepts.
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Ethics and morality, among the oldest and most challenging topics in socio-cultural anthropology, are being taken up anew with fresh vigor. 1 This ethical turn provides an occasion to reflect on the distinctiveness of the ethnographic stance among the human sciences. Given that ethics perches on the so-called fact/value divide, this essay argues that there is something to be learned from both naturalistic approaches (such as psychology and linguistics) and normative ones (such as philosophy, religion, and law)-without, however, inviting reductionism.
2 Naturalistic approaches describe a world of causes and effects, of mechanisms, or statistical correlations of which people are largely unaware. Normative ones invoke a world of principled, reflexive reasoning and decision-making carried out by self-conscious agents. I suggest that if anthropology is to shed light on the relations between the cognitive, affective, and linguistic processes described within naturalistic frameworks, on the one hand, and the ethical thought at the heart of normative ones, on the other, it must find new strategies for taking advantage of the work being done in these fields. 3 This article proposes one way of doing so that retains ethnography's distinctive stance toward the world, by attention to affordances and to the interactive dynamics that prompt reflexivity.
To see some of the characteristic problems posed by the attempt to understand ethical life, consider this incident: during the Second World War a Polish peasant woman happened to hear a group of her fellow villagers propose throwing a little Jewish girl into a well. The woman said "she's not a dog after all" and the girl's was saved (Gilbert 2003: xvi-xvii) . To the traditional philosopher, what is striking here is the absence of principled justification or indeed any serious moral argument at all (Appiah 2008: 160) . We may wonder how much conscious ethical reflection this woman's quip required on her part, or on that of the people she addresses.
It seems she merely invokes, in a rather off-the-cuff way, a common-sense category that reframes a situation so the others can see what they have proposed in a new light. To some, this apparent lack of reflexivity may cast doubt on exactly how we should count this as a full-fledged ethical act. An alternative approach would place the act in its cultural context. And although we may conclude she draws on a locally available category, clearly it was not until that moment salient to those who had, perhaps, taken the girl to be some kind of vermin. Even if we grant that communities are cross-cut with multiple conflicting value systems, there is no reason to think this woman does not share all the usual background beliefs and values with her fellow villagers:
in this case, the explanatory power of "culture" alone doesn't seem to get us very far. But neither does moral psychology, for the same reason, since it should apply equally to that woman and to the other villagers. Moreover, against the cheerful claim that this woman's instincts reveal a bedrock humane intuition, perhaps offering a clue to some universal basis for ethics, we would need to recall that a similar sort of gut reaction can find differences of skin color, sexual orientation, religion, dress, or eating habits fundamentally repugnant, and even inhuman (Haidt 2001 , Rozin and Nemeroff 1990 , Rozin and Royzman 2001 .
The Polish villager's intervention points to some key questions for any empirical research
into ethics: what are the relations among her gut level response, on the one hand, and explicit modes of argument and reasoning, on the other? How does either of those articulate with takenfor-granted community norms, habits, and their histories? Does a naturalistic explanation of that gut level response-perhaps in affective, cognitive, or neurological terms--have any bearing on what happens in the normative domain, which is defined by reflexivity, as people reason with one another, fault others, or justify themselves? Or vice versa? What made this Polish villager's intervention work? What is it to give an account of oneself (Butler 2005) ? This article cannot 4 pretend to answer all these questions, but attempts to indicate some directions to which they might lead us.
To anticipate part of my argument, giving an account of oneself (and of others) involves the invocation, implicit or explicit, of certain known or potentially knowable types of person, acts, and stances-girls, dogs, the charitable woman, the insincere man, to slander, to vindicate, contempt, benevolence. 4 This invocation is not just a matter of an ethical subject contemplating a set of ideas and values, and applying them to a particular circumstance. The preeminent instigation for giving an account is interaction with other people. I will suggest that we can gain some traction on reflexivity by looking at the affordances of interaction and the objectifications they can induce as critical components of ethical life. 5 What's crucial here is not to take the domains of reflection and talk in isolation, nor to treat them as simply expressing pre-existing moral codes, ethical precepts, or social categories. To understand how they emerge, they must be situated in relation to other dimensions of ethical life. These include both those psychological processes that work beneath people's normal awareness, and the historical ones that may range beyond it. In sketching out the parameters of these questions, I will suggest that one virtue of the ethnographic stance is that it can allow us to see how they are articulated.
This article begins by outlining the contrast between naturalistic and normative approaches to ethics, and the challenges they pose to the ethnographic stance. It then proposes that the idea of affordance shows us one way that the world that naturalistic explanations describe becomes visible in the world that ethnography encounters, that is, one of selfinterpreting, purposeful people in communities that have histories, and face constraints. Turning then to the normative perspectives, I argue that the conscious ethical reasoning that lies at their heart has its foundations in the demands of ordinary social interaction. I suggest that ethical reflection, persuasion, justification, or accusation most characteristically come into ethical pertinence when a person is called upon to give an account of herself (or, as in the Polish story, of others). When people do so, they draw not only on existing cultural vocabularies, but also, sometimes quite inventively, on what I will call the affordances of psychology, language, and interaction.
To illustrate how these dimensions work together in particular ethnographic contexts, this article turns to the problem of intentionality and the ethnographic claim that in some societies people deny being able to construe one another's intentions or thoughts. I will argue that we can gain more ethnographic insight into particular social realities if we take seriously the psychologists' assertion that intention reading is a basic part of human life everywhere, than if we treat such denials as evidence of radically different ontologies. In conclusion, I briefly point to one way the ordinary ethics of everyday interaction articulates with historically emergent and enduring ethical concepts. First, however, I will define what I mean by "ethnographic stance"
and "affordance."
Affordances and the ethnographic stance
Of anthropology's ethical turn, Michael Lambek remarks "One of the virtues of practicing ethnographic fieldwork is that you see how people act in good faith, how they try to do what they think is right in the face of conflict and try to maintain self-respect in conditions that work to undermine it" (2000: 318). His words display a key feature of the ethnographic stance, which privileges the experience of the fieldworker and the self-understanding of those among whom we live. But to take people at their best-reckoning of themselves runs counter to a 6 host of other perspectives, from the large-N statistical models and experiment-based explanations ventured by other social sciences to the unmasking gestures of post-structuralism and of ideological critique, as well as the normative arguments of moral and political philosophy.
Given such influential alternatives, what exactly does the ethnographic stance yield?
The ethical turn in ethnography can be located between two poles in contemporary thinking on the subject. On the one hand, the Kantian and utilitarian traditions in philosophy and political thought often seek to ground ethics in the rationality of self-aware actors. On the other hand, neuroscience, psychology, evolutionary theory, and economics tend to take the sources of ethical responses to be immanent in biological systems, or individuals, or selective pressures, or populations, in each case more or less independently of anyone's self-awareness. The former stresses reasons and justifications; the latter, regularities, causes, and effects. 6 The ethnographic stance, by contrast, tends to accept neither normative nor naturalistic accounts as the heart of the matter. In a more Nietzschean spirit, much current socio-cultural anthropology emphasizes the particularistic and historicizing character of the ethnographic domain. It is widely assumed that people's self-understanding is as much somatic and pragmatic as it is verbalized and reasoned out. The old view of culture as a normative playbook has largely been displaced by an insistence on fluidity, boundlessness, innovation, conflict, contradiction, the rhizomic, and so forth. regimes, and legal codes. However, the reflexivity that concerns me here is more banal, but also more pervasive, the stuff of gossip, parental didacticism, the etiquette of talking about people's intentions, and the ready-to-hand vocabulary of character. To summarize, the ethical worlds made visible in the ethnographic stance draw on affordances they discover in cognition, affect, and interaction, are manifested tacitly and explicitly in everyday interactions, and have the potential to instigate ethical reflexivity.
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The idea of affordance originated in the psychology of visual perception. As defined by James J. Gibson, "[t] he affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of its substance and its surface" in light of what it offers, provides, or furnishes for the animal that perceives it (Gibson 1977: 67-8 
Freedom and self-awareness in theories ethical life
The idea of freedom brings us to a critical point of divergence between normative and naturalistic perspectives on ethical life. Traditional philosophical definitions of ethics commonly turn on a distinction between fact and value, and between the causes of action and the reasons for it (Darwall 1998) . In these traditions, for an action to count as ethical it must be directed or seem to undermine precisely that subjective self-awareness traditionally found at the heart of the ethical. Situationist psychology holds that people's ethical judgments are strongly affected by trivial and irrelevant factors of which they are unaware, aspects of the momentary situation (e.g.
the smell of baking, having just found a some money in the street) or how a problem is framed (e.g. which element of a moral dilemma is presented first in a narrative sequence). Behavioral economics draws on similar research to emphasize to role of subliminal cues and priming effects in people's financial decisions (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) . Although these particular approaches are not universally accepted within their disciplines, they exemplify the problem faced by any concept of ethics that relies on notions of self-awareness, self-mastery, or freedom.
Foucault's use of "freedom" has both the negative character of action not wholly shaped by external forces and the positive character of a person's capacity for self-formation. This dual character reflects the mediating function of the concept of ethics, as a middle way between the positions, respectively, that subjects can wholly construct themselves or that they are wholly shaped by forces beyond them (Faubion 2001: 94) . Developing this line of thought, James Laidlaw (2002) attacks any tendency to so wholly identify morality with society that it comes to have a deterministic character to it. As Joel Robbins succinctly rephrases his conclusion, "When every observance of a collectively held rule of etiquette is as much a moral act as is refraining from killing someone who has injured you, there seems to be little to say about morality beyond obvious claims about the force of culture in guiding behavior" (Robbins 2007: 294) . (Das 2010) . What needs to be undone, rather, is the association of ethics with cultural determinism and the familiar idea that we can identify ethical differences with cultural ones in any straightforward way.
The search for a middle way between free invention and full determination is hardly unique to Foucault, of course. For instance, Pierre Bourdieu (1977) introduced the concept of habitus in part as an alternative to the deterministic character of Marxist and structuralist models.
Although habitus is a product of socio-economic circumstances, it allows room for skill and strategy. Note the difference from Foucault, however: it is precisely by virtue of operating beneath the level of awareness that the skills of habitus can function as they do. Those who are too self-conscious will be less successful at playing the game. (Anscombe 1958 , Williams 1985 . Against the rationalism of deontology, it finds the basis of ethics in the non-rational habituation of the passions (Crisp and Slote 1997: 14) . Against the emphasis on moral decisions made in discrete events, which dominates experimentalist research, it looks at ethics over the life-span.
At the center of most versions of virtue ethics is the idea of character, "set dispositions to behave systematically in one way rather than another, to lead one particular kind of life" (MacIntyre 2007: 38) . Yet this normative ideal seems to invite refutation from those who provide naturalistic explanations of behavior. Some psychologists claim, as the philosopher Maria Merritt puts it, that "few if any persons display the integrated structure of robust personality traits that would conform to the Aristotelian ideal of virtuous character" (Merritt 2000: 367; see Ross 1977) . In response, Merritt points out that people "normally witness episodes of behavior in a quite restricted range of circumstances, in which common situational regularities recur over and over again" (Merritt 2000: 373) . The most important of these 13 situations is what she calls "the sustaining social contribution to character " (2000: 374) , that is, particular social relationships and settings. Even if individuals are not wholly endowed with some "internal" stability, they are supported by consistent "external" frames of reference such as etiquette, routines, institutions, creeds. The enduring effects of one's reputation depend on the words of others, which can shape one's interactive possibilities. In his classic study of gossip in a Mayan village in Zincantan, John Haviland writes "Gossip relies on reputation while at the same time it expands on it. The fact that a man is known as a murderer certainly affects the way others treat him and the distance they maintain, and a story about a past murderer may easily trade on the man's reputation without explicitly stating it. . . . A man's proper name may even come to connote aspects of his reputation" (1977: 58-9). As Erving Goffman (1963) argued, even the victim of stigmatization may come to internalize his or her public reputation. Such regularities of interaction help form the public exoskeleton of character. They are also part of the conversational infrastructure on which ethical reflexivity depends.
One of the most pervasive sites for such regularities is ordinary conversation. These regularities need not be as explicit as gossip, but I will suggest they are both effective even when unnoticed, and also provide a stimulous for the emergence of more explicit ways of talking about ethics. For example, "repair" is a ubiquitous micro-feature of conversation in which participants try to resolve problems in the interaction. Although these might concern organizational glitches, such as confusion in turn-taking, the main focus of repair is intersubjectivity. Repairs arise when people perceive themselves to be losing "the shared reality of the moment" (Schegloff 2006: 78) and act to restore it-clarifying that a seeming insult was only meant as a joke, or that an apparent demand for information ("Is it hot in here?") was actually a deferential request ("Please open the window").
Interaction depends on participants' expectations for coordination and mutual recognition. These expectations serve as default expectations against which alternative actions, or inaction, such as failing to respond to a greeting, or ignoring a question, come to have significance (Grice 1976) . Such breeches of expectation, or ruptures in shared reality, may constitute acts of disregard for others. As the linguistic anthropologist Jack Sidnell puts it, When persons interact they necessarily and unavoidably assess whether they are being heard, ignored, disattended, and so on. Commitment to the expectations of interaction seems to blend easily into commitment to the other person (Clark 2006) . One person's neglect of the demands of routine joint activity may be taken by others as a failure of social recognition. The minor but ubiquitous expectation that people will display regard for one another in these ways can be taken be the basis for ascriptions of character. Thus conversations are not just about ethical judgments (as in gossip), the very technical requirements of interaction also may themselves provide resources for those judgments (affording inferences about intentions or character). This is most evident when people encounter outsiders to local norms of interaction. It is a commonplace of sociolinguistics that even barely 15 perceptible differences in timing, prosody, or word choice can lead people to intuitive character judgments, that, for instance, one's interlocutor is arrogant or timid, honest or crooked (Gumperz 1982 , Sacks 1972 ).
The technical details of conversation largely work beneath participants' awareness, and can be treated much like other mechanisms subject to naturalistic explanation (Atkinson and Heritage 1984) . But the participants can potentially respond to them as ethical affordances to be scrutinized and elaborated. That is, as affordances, they can become objects of ethical reflexivity. In Samoa, for instance, "Hierarchy is maintained through the display of fa'aaloalo turn to intentionality and intersubjectivity, I suggest these basic aspects of human cognition can, in some circumstances, become foci of attention. When they become topics of explicit talk, they can give rise to relatively stables sets of practices and ideas, fostering the heightened consciousness of full-fledged ethical reflexivity, and what, in the concluding section, I will call historical objects.
Intention reading as ethical affordance
One point at which the universalistic assertions of psychology and the particularism of ethnography can clash is in how they view intentionality. Developmental psychologists are finding that infants become oriented to other people's intentions, and even evaluate them, very early in life (Onishi and Baillargeon 2005 , Hamlin, Wynn, and Bloom 2007 , Meltzoff 1995 , Woodward 1998 . As children begin to acquire language, according to Michael Tomasello, they "must in some sense simulate the perspective of other persons as they are expressing themselves linguistically" (Tomasello 1999: 176) . The capacities to take another person's perspective and,
beyond that, to infer their likely intentions, are components of so-called Theory of Mind or ToM (Baron-Cohen 1995, Wellman 1990, Wellman and Liu 2004). Among the diagnostic features of
ToM over the course of a child's development are the abilities to distinguish between intentional and unintentional actions, classify actions according to goals, direct joint attention with another, enter into pretend play and deception, and grasp that mental states are independent of physical reality. None of this requires that human "mind reading" be unerring; indeed, simple misunderstanding and anxieties about it are pervasive features of social existence, and intentional falsehood (for which ToM is a precondition) may be a necessary one. 10 The point, rather, is that people are apparently chronically prone to seek out signs of intentionality.
The propensity for intention-reading, something explained in naturalistic terms by (2006: 262) . Again, it is not the case the Mopan have no capacity to read minds: rather, these are affordances for ethical elaboration, leading to emphatic denial of something they in fact seem to be doing.
In both cases, local semiotic ideologies about the signs of intention, or their lack, have consequences for how people in fact act. But the ethical implications go beyond talk. We do not need to accept the strong cultural-constructivist claim that ToM itself is merely a local phenomenon, an ontology developed in some cultural contexts and not others, in order to recognize that stressing it or playing it down will lead to divergent ethical worlds. Indeed, if
ToM were merely a local invention (let's say, a peculiarity of the modern West with its obsession with individuals, interiority, and intentionality), and the opacity doctrine another local 22 invention (an entirely distinct Melanesian or Mayan ontology), the conjunction of these observations would not seem to tell us much even ethnographically, beyond a conventional lesson about the boundless fecundity of the human imagination. If, on the other hand, ToM is ubiquitous, some societies elaborating it, others finding it ethically problematic, and still others giving it little thought one way or another, then it appears as both a source of difficulties in its own right, an inducement to reflection. In this respect, ToM is an affordance with which people can (but need not necessarily) perform ethical work. When they do so, people's responses to other minds register specific ethical worries or political problems that would not be as ethnographically visible were these responses only sheer cultural inventions or free standing ontologies.
Objectification and the historicity of ethics
I began this article by contrasting two quite distinct approaches to understanding ethical life, that of naturalistic explanations (exemplified by psychology and linguistics), and that of normative reasons and reflexivity (exemplified by philosophy). A third approach, the ethnographic stance is distinguished in part by its commitment to keeping people's selfunderstanding and sense of self-worth at the center of its visual field. But rather than treat ethnography as standing in isolation, or taking people's self-understanding only at face value, I
asked how the world it encounters might articulate with those encountered in naturalistic and normative approaches. As (a partial) answer, I proposed that ethical affordance describes in non- Prussia, and to respond with a challenge to duel would be laughable (see Appiah 2010) . To be "graciously condescending," the way a Duke could act toward an inferior in Eighteenth Century England, can be only an insulting paradox in Ann Arbor, where no one should baldly appear to think themselves above others and the very meaning of the word "condescending " can only hold negative connotations (Herzog 1998) . And "charity" in middle class India today is hardly the same as that described in the Bhagavad Gita (Bornstein 2011 Here the father gives the flow of action a description (being a good sport) and anchors it with reference to a larger ethical theory (good sportsmanship).
This small moment of objectification, with its almost ritualized dialogue structure, is not radically different in kind from more formal activities like debates about justice (Dave 2102) , sermons (Hirschkind 2006) , or catechisms (Keane 2007) . Nor from the telegraphic metalanguage of a New York crack dealer: "Real crazy. Yeah! Ray's a fuckin' pig; Ray's a wild motherfucker. He's got juice. You understand Felipe? Juice! . . . On the street that means respect" (Bourgois 2003: 24) . And all share certain features with gossip, which in Zincantan, as perhaps most places, "is clearly aimed at the interlocutor. People try, through gossip, to convince their interlocutors, to arouse their sympathies, or to recruit their support" (Haviland 1977: 83-4) .
In all these cases, the explicit verbalization of ethical descriptions is prompted by an encounter between, respectively, children to be taught, political opponents to be won over, congregations to admonished, believers to be disciplined, ethnographers to be wised up, neighbors to collude with. These examples of ethical talk seem to require that the speakers see themselves from outside, taking another's point of view on their own thoughts and actions. That is, they take the reciprocity of perspectives described by the ToM researchers as an ethical affordance. But this kind of reflexivity also depends on the objectification that results from interactions with others. This objectification (in the first example above, the words "good sportsmanship") in turn endows it with at least the potential for historical endurance beyond the moment, as people continue over time to take "good sportsmanship" to be a standard by which they can judge themselves and others, perhaps as a virtue peculiar to particular social orders, or a model for international goodwill like, say, the Olympic Games.
Let's return briefly to the question posed by the Polish woman who insists that the Jewish child is not a dog, with that debate-silencing addition "after all." Our sources provide only the skimpiest hint of the larger story, hardly enough to settle the matter. But taking this anecdote as a thought experiment, we might start with the fact that the woman's intervention takes the form of a bald verbal assertion in a scene of social interaction. Against the corrosive findings of experimental psychology, we may point to her durable ability to enter into that scene based on a lifetime participating in the interactive routines that embed the community's ethical expectations (most of them unspoken) and make her a legitimate speaker-that give her a voice (something, perhaps, not available to everyone in the village). Against the most radical forms of social construction we can point to the ways in which any such historical community has taken up 28 certain affordances made available by basic psychological and sociological conditions, and responded to the quandaries they may pose. Against sheer cultural determinism, we might speculate that it is this woman's self-respect that impels her to speak up against the weight of public opinion.
Yet her self-respect is not, I think, self-standing. If it draws on a sense of" the good"
shared within a community, I want to suggest that it derives its efficacy more directly from the kinds of interactive commitments and capacities noted above. The problem of freedom within social and cultural contexts, discussed above, may then turn on how those interactions produce forms of recognition (of the girl, of the woman) and self-recognition (of the woman, of the mob) against that very community which was itself an fundamental source of those terms of recognition in the first place. To take people at their word is, in part, to understand how they come to take themselves at their word.
All this may remain subliminal, but should those forms of recognition become crystallized as explicit objects of reflection, they may be rendered available as ideas that can readily be referred to over an over again, potentially consolidated as norms to be defended or criticized. In short, they have the potential to become historical objects. By this I mean ideas that can be verbalized as a justifications, excuses, recognizable character types, nameable misdeeds or virtues. And more elaborated yet, these ideas can enter into the production of moral codes and ethical precepts that are widely recognized across a community, and have some endurance over time-and that are often tied to disciplines geared toward the purposeful cultivation of reflexivity, such as religious contemplation, philosophical debate, ascetic exercises, or rights activism. This is the point at which ethnography most directly encounters the raw materials with which the normative approaches to ethical life have usually worked.
I began by suggesting that at the heart of the ethnographic stance is a commitment to people's self-understanding and sense of self-worth. Against this, the naturalistic and normative approaches to ethical life can be seen not just as alternatives, but as challenges. Naturalistic explanations, in their strongest form, can seem to undermine the authority of people's ethical self-understanding. Normative approaches may be less debunking, but their proponents are often worried that ethnographic specificities fail to get to the heart of the matter-at what is ethics for humans, perhaps, and not just for Los Angelinos, Samoans, Korowai, or Zincantecans. This article is motivated by the sense that, rather than dismiss these challenges, we accept them as a means to sharpen anthropologists' own understanding of what exactly the ethnographic stance can offer. The purpose is not to reassure ourselves, but to provoke an approach to ethical life of a scope more adequate to the range of difficulties, contradictions, and imponderables it presents.
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